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Introduction
Over the past thirty years there has been a marked increase in inequality across most democratic countries around the world. The super-rich now earn a much greater proportion of income and hold a much greater proportion of wealth than they did in the 1970s.
The well-known Gini coefficient has steadily increased. The wages of rich individuals have increased much more quickly than the wages of poorer individuals and the middle class has been hit hard, with the relative wage of the median earner steadily declining. Measured in any of a number of ways, the distribution of income across societies has become increasingly skewed toward the rich.
One might expect the competitive electoral process to create incentives for parties and candidates to adopt policies that redress economic inequalities: if economic advantage is concentrated in the hands of a few, the disadvantaged masses should elect parties committed to redistributive policies. This dynamic of course occurs in varying degrees across many democracies, but it is often striking how weak the democratic response is to inequality. As income and wealth become increasingly concentrated among the very rich in the US, for example, so has the prominence of right-wing policies that call for a sharply limited role of government. Similar dynamics unfold in other countries, rich and poor. This frequently tepid response to the concentration of wealth presents a puzzle: Why do voters, faced with rising income disparities, often elect parties that oppose policies that could address these disparities? Or, put differently, why does it often seem so challenging for "class politics"
-where competition centers to a large extent on the role of government in addressing economic disparities -to emerge in democratic polities?
An important part of the answer to this question can be found by considering a second puzzle, one that is typically treated as unrelated to concerns about inequality. In many countries, an "ethnic identity" with which one is born -by which I mean not only ethnic identities, but also racial, religious, linguistic or tribal identities, depending on the context -becomes a salient element of electoral competition. This book has two related goals. The first is to offer a theory of electoral competition and voting behavior that describes how ethnic diversity and economic inequality can interact to influence the salience of class and ethnic identities in elections. The second is to consider how the role of different identities in electoral competition should influence expectations about the extent to which democracies should produce policies that redress inequality. The remainder of this chapter describes in broad strokes the argument and its implications. If parties compete for votes by making commitments to voters about how government resources should be distributed, how do parties make it clear which specific voters will benefit from a given party's victory, and how do they make these commitments credible, so voters will believe that parties will follow through on their commitments? One important strategy can be to make commitments to specific groups that have boundaries of membership that cannot be easily changed. Such commitments will be clear insofar as voters recognize the group boundaries, and they will be credible insofar as voters understand that if parties renege on promises to groups, they will lose the support of the entire group.
The argument
Ethnic and class identities are particularly useful in electoral politics in large part because they often define group boundaries that parties can exploit in efforts to win votes.
When a party makes a commitment to a particular class -say the non-rich -and this party wins, a rich voter cannot easily change his or her "class identity" in order to obtain policy benefits from the government. Similarly, when a party commits to providing benefits to a particular ethnic group, a voter in the losing ethnic group cannot decide after the election to change his or her ethnic identity to that of the winning group. For this reason, ethnic identity is also often salient as an exclusion device. Class and ethnic identities can thus be exploited by parties trying to win votes: class parties can form by making commitments to income groups, while ethnic parties can form by making commitments to ethnic groups.
But though ethnic and class identities make possible credible commitments by parties to groups, they also constrain the types of commitments that parties can make. Given that the boundaries between groups make commitments credible, when parties ignore these boundaries, for example by making commitments to random subsets of groups, their promises become less clear and credible. Thus, if we think about electoral competition from the perspective of group-based commitments, the size of groups will influence the types of commitments that parties can make, and in particular the amount that parties can promise to voters.
Consider a bare bones model of how this could work. Suppose there exists some government pie, (π) and that parties compete for votes by making promises to groups about how the pie should be distributed in society. A class-based party can promise to distribute the pie to a particular income group and an ethnic-based party can promise to distribute the pie to a particular ethnic group. Voters have two identities, their class and ethnicity. The identity that becomes relevant to them at election time depends on the type of party they support. "Class identity" prevails when a voter supports a class-based party and "class politics" prevails when the government pie is distributed to individuals based on their income. "Ethnic identity" prevails when a voter support a party committed to his or her ethnic group and "ethnic politics" prevails when the government pie is distributed to individuals based on their ethnic identity.
Since voters wish to receive as much as possible, the amount they can receive from a particular party will be constrained by the number of voters the party represents. It is easy to depict the logic in a simple framework where there are two class identities (rich and non-rich) and two ethnic identities (majority and minority), as in Parties can represent a column (e.g., there can be a party of the majority group or a party of the minority group) or a row (e.g., there can be a party of the rich or a party of the non-rich). What is the most that any party could offer to voters?
The Rich (nR=30)
The Non-Rich (nNR=70)
Ethnic group A (nA=63)
Ethnic group B (nB=37)
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The Rich (nR=40)
The Non-Rich (nNR=60) . Thus, the ethnic party could defeat the class party and government policy would distribute to individuals based on their ethnicity. In the bottom panel, the dynamic would be different. An ethnic party must spread the pie among 64 individuals and a class party must spread the pie among 60 individuals. Thus, the class-party can offer more to voters than can the ethnic party and class politics will prevail.
The ideas developed in this book derive from this basic logic about group size and minimal winning electoral coalitions. If group identities make possible credible commitments, then parties representing larger majorities will be disadvantaged because they can offer less to their supporters than can parties representing smaller majorities. When the number of non-rich is "too large," for example, it is more difficult for a class-based party to win.
But what it means for a group to be "too large" depends on the size of alternative electoral coalitions. In the example above, if the majority ethnic group is very large, then class politics can prevail even if the number of non-rich voters is relatively large. As the size of the majority ethnic group becomes smaller, the definition of "too large" changes, and becomes smaller. Expectations about whether class politics or ethnic politics prevails in electoral competition should therefore be influenced by the interaction of two variables: the number of non-rich and the number in the majority ethnic group. As the number of non-rich grows smaller relative to the number in the majority ethnic group, class politics should be more likely to prevail. As the number in an ethnic majority grows smaller relative to the number of non-rich, ethic politics should be more likely to prevail. I develop these ideas about the role of social structure in more detail in Chapter 3.
Party competition and social structure. To understand the role of social structure in
shaping party competition, we should not simply assume that particular types of parties will win under particular distributions of voters with respect to class and ethnicity. Party formation is costly and a theory of how social structure matters in electoral competition should describe why parties form and what types of platforms they offer given the social structure. In the distributive framework here, there is always an advantaged party (the one that represents the smallest majority), so we might ask why losing parties would ever form? And if losing parties have no incentive to form, why do leaders of winning parties have incentives to distribute anything at all to voters? To answer such questions, we need to be explicit about how political parties emerge endogenously from social structure.
To this end, the argument rests on two assumptions about the motivations of party entrepreneurs. The first is that potential party entrepreneurs care about the rents from office; that is, about the private gain they can reap from keeping a slice of the government pie for themselves. Rents from winning create incentives for individuals to form parties that represent the advantaged (smaller) majority, but they also create incentives for such entrepreneurs to maximize their rents by distributing as little as possible to the group members they represent. The second assumption is that potential party entrepreneurs care about policy outcomes; that is, about how the government pie is distributed to voters, and in particular about the policy benefits that winning parties give to the group to which the entrepreneur belongs. Losing parties therefore form to ensure that the rent-seeking incentives of winning parties do not allow such parties to keep excessive rents. The entrepreneurs for the losing parties benefit from paying the cost of party formation because they benefit directly from the policies that their losing party forces the winning party to adopt. In the top panel of Figure 1 .1, for example, a non-rich individual from group A would have an incentive to form a class based party that would lose because (a) doing so can force the winning party representing group A to offer more to group A members, and (b) the individual forming the losing class party is a member of group A.
These assumptions lead to clear predictions about how many parties should form, about
what types of policies they should offer to voters, and about which identities become salient to individuals when the vote. And group size remains central. When the number of non-rich is small relative to the number in the majority ethnic group, a class party representing this group will form and win the votes of the non-poor, who vote their class identity. The winning class-based party will distribute as much of the government pie to the non-rich as they need to in order to win against the other party that forms, which represents the majority ethnic group. By contrast, when the number in the majority group is small relative to the number of non-rich, an ethnic party representing the majority group will form, and will win the votes of the members of this group, who vote their ethnic identity. The winning ethnic-based party will distribute to members of their group as much of the government pie as they need to in order to win against class-based party that forms to influence policy.
Empirical implications.
To go from the abstract theory to specific empirical implication requires linking the key variables in the model -the number of non-rich and the number in the majority group -to substantive variables that can be measured. I take up this task in Chapter 5. Some might be concerned at the outset that it makes little sense to take the size of income groups as exogenously given. Instead, it may make more sense to assume that governments can determine who is "non-rich" through policy, for example by giving benefits only to those below the median income in society. Chapter 5 begins by considering this issue, pointing out limitations of such a median voter framework but also pointing out how the theoretical framework employed here could be integrated into a median voter model. The chapter then argues that income inequality -and specifically the Gini coefficient -is a good measure of the number of non-rich, one that emerges directly from the parameters of the model and also from the median-voter framework for thinking about the number of non-rich. The chapter also argues that ethnic diversityand specifically, a measure of ethnic polarization -is a good measure of the number in the majority group. As ethnic polarization increases, the expected size of the ethnic majority decreases. Thus, the model suggests that inequality and ethnic polarization should interact to influence the nature of electoral politics in democratic systems.
The theoretical model has a number of empirical implications related to inequality, 
Some illustrative observations and examples.
African democracies are often notorious for the intensity of their ethnic politics. By contrast, if we look at Scandinavian countries, class politics rules and there is substantial redistribution from rich to poor. Why might this difference exist between Africa and Scandinavia?
These countries are obviously different in many, many ways, which may make the comparison of Africa with Scandinavia seem strange. But the framework here would simply reminds us to observe that in Africa, where inequality is typically high and the vast majority of people often have low incomes, it would be very challenging for a class party to form.
If a party says "We're the party of the poor," they can be easily undercut because they can Shertzer (2013) provides a useful example from municipal elections in four large American cities at the turn of the 20th century. Local politicians in the wards of these cities had substantial power to influence the neighborhoods in which to make infrastructure investments (like those related to sanitation and transportation) and they could provide access to municipal jobs, protection from gangs, access to public works contracts, and even inside tracks to jobs in the private sector. Whether a particular politician was responsive to the needs of particular immigrant groups depended on their electoral value, and for the new immigrants from places like Italy, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland that were flooding into these cities at the time, they could become politically valuable to politicians only if the undertook a costly naturalization process. Thus, the propensity of immigrants to naturalize is an important indicator of political mobilization by politicians of ethnic groups at that time.
What determined whether immigrants from a particular group would in fact be willing to pay the price of naturalizing in a given political ward? Shertzer focuses on group size: immigrants who belong to groups that can become pivotal to the Democratic Party's ability to to form minimal winning electoral coalitions would have the greatest incentive to naturalize, and should therefore have been most likely to be the subject of mobilization efforts by a politician in a ward. Whether a group could be pivotal depended on the group's own size (was it large enough to facilitate a victory?), which had to be considered relative The NEP created a system that conferred government benefits on individuals who were members of the "Bumiputera," an ethnic category that existed prior to this time and that referred to a wide range of indigenous ethnic groups, but excluded the Chinese and In-dians. 2 These benefits included financial assistance for buying housing, quotas for places in universities, quotas for jobs in the public sector, privileged access to government public works contracts and preferential treatment in the purchase of shares in companies. Importantly, all of the benefits were available to individuals from the Bumiputera, independent of their economic status, and many of the programs specifically benefited the wealthiest from among the indigenous groups. Since its creation, the NEP has been supported by the ruling Barisan National coalition (BN), a central member of which is the United Malays National Organization.
From the perspective of the argument here, it is not surprising to see the emergence of this ethnic policy. In 1970, the Bumiputera constituted 56% of the population, making it an attractive "group" on which to base an ethnic division of government spoils in a relatively poor country. But the effect of the NEP has been to change the ethnic composition of Malaysian society, with many ethnic Chinese leaving Malaysia, increasing the proportion of the population who are Bumiputera. In 2010, the Bumiputera share of the population rose to 67 percent. 3 Thus, the argument developed here suggests that this should make the NEP quite fragile, as such as large group must divide the spoils of government thinly. 4 .
Indeed, a 2008 survey found that 71% of Malaysians thought the NEP was "obsolete" and in that year, opposition parties vowing to roll back the NEP won control of Panang, an economic hub in Malaysia. The implications of the theoretical argument and evidence are contrary to what is typically assumed about democracy and inequality, and they are discouraging. Inequality often makes class politics less viable and discourage policies that redress inequality by encouraging ethnic politics. Thus, democracy might be expected to do the least to redistribute income when inequality is high. The book concludes with a brief summary of the argument and evidence, and discusses some pathways that might foster class-based policies that redress inequality and discourage ethnic politics.
